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The psychologist E. B. Titchener is credited with introducing the notion of “stimulus error” into 
experimental psychology. As discussed by Boring (1921), the term has several applications. Its primary 
meaning, as in Titchener (1905, xxvi), characterizes the “error” that occurs when subjects in experiments 
directed toward sensations use their beliefs about the physical stimulus in making their responses, 
rather than reporting the phenomenal attributes of sensation: 
 
We are constantly confusing sensations with their stimuli, with their objects, with their meanings. Or 
rather – since the sensation of psychology has no object or meaning – we are constantly confusing 
logical abstraction with psychological analysis; we abstract a certain aspect of an object or meaning, and 
then treat this aspect as if it were a simple mental process, an element in the mental representation of 
the object or meaning. (ibid.) 
 
 The “error” results when, instead of holding object-perception and meaning in abeyance, the subject 
abstracts an object-content from perception and reports that content. Titchener gives examples from 
auditory, gustatory, and haptic perception but also alludes to the tendency in visual spatial perception 
to overlook sensations (which correspond to “peripheral cues”) in favor of objects arrayed in space 
(1909, 314). According to him, the elemental sensations of vision are bidimensional and we acquire 
perception of the third dimension (1909, 303–6). Boring (1921, 462–3) describes an instance from size 
perception, deriving from Martius (1889), of the need to direct experimental subjects to respond to the 
apparent sizes of rods at various distances rather than their actual sizes (to which subjects normally 
attend). 
 
 Viewed in one way, the notion of a stimulus error belongs to an outdated viewpoint that draws a hard 
and-fast distinction between sensation and perception. Accordingly, sensations are pure states of 
sensory effect, devoid of interpretation and meaning. In vision, they correspond to the retinal image. 
Philosophically, they may be equated with now discredited “sense data.” Such sensations are mistakenly 
posited as what we find by “introspecting” or “turning inward”; but, in fact, we find nothing by looking 
inward. In reflecting on seeing, we only find the world out there. Subjects who are directed to introspect 
are right to report only on the object, because there is nothing else available. 
 
This response accords with present-day philosophical accounts known as naive direct realism (or plain 
“disjunctivism”) and content physicalism (or the pure informational, intentional, or representational 
theory). Such positions deny subjective intermediaries in vision and point to the “transparency” of 
perception, its world-presenting character, as a refutation of the older view of introspection ascribed to 
Wundt and Titchener (as “structuralists”). 
 
 As it happens, these more recent responses are not well-attuned to the actual practices and debates 
that surrounded the phenomenon of stimulus error. Moreover, the aspects of these recent positions 
that would discredit the notion of subject-dependent aspects of perception are heavily theory-
dependent: they rely on contentious analyses of the relation between perception and its objects and 
make too easy an inference from phenomenal “transparency.” In this way, they partake of a feature of 
the earlier discussions that I want to highlight: the interplay between experimental design and theory. 
Other theorists besides Titchener found differences when subjects were asked to report on phenomenal 
aspects of experience as opposed to actual object properties (perhaps without finding “error” in the 
latter or treating the former as elemental sensations). By comparing Titchener’s notion of sensation with 
other outlooks, I show how different theoretical stances yield different conclusions about the legitimacy 
of experimental protocols aimed at uncovering subject-dependent aspects of perception. 
 Although Titchener believed that sensations are the primitive (unanalyzable) elements of mental life, 
for him even the seasoned introspector does not experience unvarnished sensations. Rather, we 
discover the properties of sensations by establishing conditions for isolating them and then reporting 
introspectively on their attributes, such as quality, intensity, or duration, all of which cannot be attended 
at once or made the subject of a single report. From his point of view, if one succeeds in focusing on the 
pitch of an upper partial tone in a musical note, one has noticed an attribute of an element that was 
present in the tone all along. Still, the notion that there are primitive sensations that compose complex 
experiences comes from theory (Titchener 1915). 
 
 Various investigators who were sympathetic to phenomenal reports, from James (1890) through Gibson 
(1950), accepted that one begins from unitary phenomenal experiences that are as of a scene or sound 
in the world (phenomenal “transparency”). They then applied diverse procedures in studying aspects or 
attributes of such experiences. How they conceived the experimentally determined attributes depended 
on their theoretical outlooks. Some theorists, including the Gestalt psychologists and Gibson, held that 
in vision the experience of a three-dimensional visual world of objects is not only phenomenally 
immediate by psychologically primitive, as is an ordinary tone. Accordingly, one experiences the upper 
partial tone, or a bidimensional visual field, by adopting a special attitude that does not uncover a pre-
existing element but produces a new, secondary sort of experience in place of normal experience. 
Nonetheless, such theorists allowed that experimental investigations can be conducted by attending to 
phenomenal attributes or dimensions of normal experience, in abstraction from other attributes and 
meaning. Thus, one might attend to sizes, distances, or shapes as attributes within visual experience. 
 
 This paper explores the interplay between experimental protocols and theoretical outlooks in relation 
to “stimulus error.” From the time of Martius (1889), experimenters used instructions to invoke specific 
perceptual attitudes in subjects. Subjects might be asked to attend to “apparent” size or to judge the 
“objective” physical size of objects. The latter task does not produce an “error” but simply a different 
perceptual response. By examining the use of instructional protocols by Fernberger, Brunswik, Boring, 
and others in the investigation of size and shape perception in vision, I seek to determine whether they 
see the differing responses under differing instructions as resulting from (1) changes in phenomenal 
experience due to a change in task; (2) access to different aspects of a unitary phenomenal experience; 
or (3) access to distinct phenomenal and conceptual dimensions of experience. The answers can be 
related to differing philosophical analyses of the perception-object relation, including naive realism and 
content physicalism as above, but also critical direct realism and appearance theories, in which objects 
are presented via subject-dependent aspects of experience. 
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